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COMMANDEERING INFORMATION 
 (AND INFORMING THE COMMANDEERED) 
ANTHONY JOHNSTONE† 
In response to Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal 
Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
The anti-commandeering rule1 just hit its high point. Fifteen years after 
the Supreme Court last held a law unconstitutional under the rule,2 the 
Court held in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, which conditions the continuation 
of Medicaid funding on a broad extension of program benefits, unconstitu-
tionally commandeers state governments for federal purposes.3 “Congress 
may not simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic 
army,’ and that is what it is attempting to do with the Medicaid expansion.”4 
 
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. Former Solicitor 
for the State of Montana. Thanks to Benjamin Thomas and Erin Borek for editing, and to 
my family for their support. 
1 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (explaining that the federal govern-
ment “may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program’” (alterations in original) (quoting Hodel 
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). 
2 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that federally mandated local 
law enforcement background checks for gun purchases violate the anti-commandeering rule). 
3 See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
4 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982)). 
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This was not just coercion, it was “a gun to the head.”5 Compared with 
previous anti-commandeering cases, Sebelius was extraordinary both 
because of its broad scope6 and because seven Justices supported the 
controlling reasoning.7 Most importantly, perhaps, the Court’s opinion 
assigned the question of whether to accept the Medicaid expansion to 
the states, where the federalism principles contested in Sebelius are now 
entering (or, given the state origins of the litigation, reentering) debates 
in statehouses across the country.8 
Public health insurance is just one topic in a broader debate over the 
relationship between state and federal policies on guns, immigration, 
marijuana, marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and other political issues yet 
to emerge.9 Some of these debates reflect deep and persistent national 
divisions,10 while others may be moving toward a national consensus.11 
What distinguishes all of them, however, is that lacking direction from a 
polarized and paralyzed federal regime, state actors have taken a lead in 
 
5 Id. at 2604. 
6 Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the case was “the first time ever” the Court 
found “an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive” of the States). 
7 Id. at 2666-67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Seven Members of the 
Court agree that the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.”). 
8 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and the Constitutional Gestalt 
26 (Georgetown Law Scholarly Commons, Paper No. 12-152, 2012), available at http://scholarship. 
law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1098/ (“[T]he dominant constitutional gestalt has become open to 
challenge through formal legal argument in ordinary litigation. The [Sebelius] opinions have 
obvious and immediate relevance to formal legal argument and academic disputation, but from 
there their influence is likely to extend . . . ultimately to public political debate.”). 
9 See, e.g., Kit Johnson & Peter J. Spiro, Debate, Immigration Preemption After United States 
v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/12-
2012/Arizona.pdf (debating the Court’s opinion on immigration preemption and forecasting its 
impact on future state immigration laws).  
10 Compare, e.g., Wash. Initiative Measure No. 502 (July 8, 2011), available at http://sos.wa. 
gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf (proposing amendments to the state code to legalize marijua-
na), with Senate Advances Measure Opposing Marijuana, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB. (Feb. 9, 2013), 
http://www.idahopress.com/news/state/senate-advances-measure-opposing-marijuana/article_8ea7ffac-
7267-11e2-bb56-0019bb2963f4.html (“The Senate State Affairs Committee voted unanimously Friday to 
introduce and hold a hearing on a resolution pitched by [Senator Chuck Winder] opposing marijuana 
use in any form. The measure also urges President Barack Obama and the U.S. Department of Justice to 
enforce existing federal laws tied to moving drugs across state lines.”). 
11 See, e.g., Ashley Parker, Senators Call Their Bipartisan Immigration Plan a ‘Breakthrough,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/us/politics/senators-unveil-
bipartisan-immigration-principles.html?_r=0 (“A bipartisan group of senators unveiled on 
Monday a set of principles for comprehensive immigration legislation that includes a pathway 
to citizenship for the 11 million immigrants already in the country illegally, contingent on first 
securing the nation’s borders.”). 
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addressing these controversial issues.12 Whether and how states can depart 
from, or even resist, the prevailing federal policies on these issues will be 
determined in part by arguments about federalism. A new wave of federal-
ism scholarship recognizes how the evolving role of states in a dynamic 
federal system complicates traditional conceptions of dual sovereignty.13 
In Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?,14 Robert 
Mikos offers an important contribution to the scholarly discussion of this 
growing trend by presenting two novel insights. First, Professor Mikos 
recognizes that information exchanged between federal and state govern-
ments is an expanding ground for conflict between federal and state policy 
spheres.15 Second, he observes that federal demands for state-gathered 
information are formally and functionally indistinguishable from other 
forms of prohibited commandeering.16 Both of these points will reverber-
ate in future conversations about federalism, and I could not attempt to 
exhaust their implications here. 
Instead, my Response will amplify and extend Professor Mikos’s first 
point, which identifies the commandeering problem, and will suggest some 
limits to his second point, which proposes a judicially managed solution.17 
Commandeering information should be recognized, like other forms of 
federal coercion of state officials, as imposing significant costs on states. Yet 
the costs to state autonomy from commandeering information, and the 
prospects that federal judges might mitigate them, are (as they are for 
 
12 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012) (requiring state law enforcement 
officers to verify the immigration status of suspected illegal immigrants); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 19-A, § 650-A (2013) (authorizing same-sex marriage by codifying marriage as “the legally 
recognized union of 2 people”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West 2012) (permitting 
physician-assisted suicide by allowing a capable, terminally ill patient to “make a written request 
for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner”). 
13 See generally, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism 
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and 
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE 
L.J. 534 (2011); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Ernest A. 
Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism (Aug. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156351. 
14 Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103 (2012). 
15 See id. at 112-14. 
16 See id. at 137-44. 
17 See id. at 154 (“I propose that courts treat demands for information as constitutionally 
prohibited commandeering.”). 
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commandeering generally) relatively limited. Further, the costs to political 
accountability from commandeering information are difficult to assess, but 
these may be more effectively mitigated through political means. Even if 
Professor Mikos’s conception of commandeering information is not enforced 
by the Judiciary, it at least helps the states (and their citizens) recognize that 
they have been commandeered. 
I. COMMANDEERING’S COSTS 
From a federalism perspective, Professor Mikos argues persuasively that 
federal use of state information is formally and functionally indistinguishable 
from prohibited commandeering.18 Formally, the Printz Court’s distinction 
between commandeering and “the provision of information to the Federal 
Government”19 or, in Justice O’Connor’s formulation, “purely ministerial 
reporting requirements,”20 is not supported by the holding of Printz itself. 
The Brady Act provision at issue in the case required state law enforcement 
officials to “provide information that belongs to the State and is available to 
[law enforcement officials] only in their official capacity.”21 The Court made 
clear that this informational component, and not the subsidiary duties to 
accept and process federal paperwork, was the primary focus of its opin-
ion.22 The main distinction between Printz and the information comman-
deering cases discussed by Professor Mikos is that in Printz, the federal 
government did not seek the state information for its own use. Rather, it 
was “the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state 
executive . . . .”23 Beyond this, the Court said next to nothing about the 
difference between the compelled gathering of information at issue in Printz 
and the compelled reporting of information at issue in the cases Professor 
Mikos discusses. Indeed, compelled reporting to federal officials of state-
gathered information is a more straightforward example of commandeering 
for federal use, because the information itself passes into federal officials’ 
hands. By the Court’s own “categorical” logic, commandeering information 
by either compelled gathering or compelled reporting should be subject to 
the Printz Court’s bright-line, anti-commandeering rule.24 
 
18 See id. at 137-44. 
19 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997). 
20 Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
21 Id. at 932 n.17 (majority opinion). 
22 See id. at 933-34 (stating that if the informational demand were nullified, the command to 
destroy forms and the like was “simply inoperative”). 
23 Id. at 932. 
24 See id. at 932-33 (rejecting a balancing analysis in favor of a categorical rule). 
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Functionally, the Court’s suggested distinction between commandeering 
law enforcement and gathering information does not take account of the 
dynamic costs to states of gathering information subject to federal use. The 
conventional account offered by the courts is that such information is 
something like a “nonrivalrous public good” that the federal government 
can use with no substantial cost to the states.25 Yet, as Professor Mikos 
demonstrates, states typically gather information to facilitate regulatory 
policies that reflect a compromise between intrastate public and private 
ends. For example, a state might legalize medical uses of marijuana on the 
condition that users register with and submit to regulation by the state.26 
The prospect that the federal government may use the state’s information 
against the very sources of that information chills those sources’ otherwise 
willing provision of information. This chill imposes additional costs on the 
state, which must either increase its own information-gathering resources or 
decrease the amount of information gathered. These costs are as real and 
significant as the costs imposed by other forms of commandeering.27 
The threat of commandeering imposes political as well as economic 
costs. By “foreclos[ing] the optimal balance the states could otherwise strike 
between severity and enforceability,”28 commandeering state-gathered infor-
mation can force states to forgo the public policy benefits that accompany 
that information-gathering. Taking certain policy options off the table, 
while forcing states “to help the federal government enforce and administer 
policies [that state officials] or their constituents oppose,”29 imposes a 
political cost, which I call an “autonomy cost,” on states by limiting their 
self-determination of policy. Professor Mikos identifies another kind of 
political cost incurred when the “commandeering of the states’ information-
gathering apparatus blurs the lines of accountability for unpopular enforce-
ment actions,”30 which I call an “accountability cost.” 
 
25 Mikos, supra note 14, at 141. 
26 See id. at 111. 
27 See id. at 121-26. 
28 Id. at 126. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 127. 
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A. Autonomy Costs 
Professor Mikos frames his analysis and core prescriptive claims in 
terms of “state autonomy.”31 For purposes of his analysis, Professor Mikos 
defines autonomy as state officials’ freedom from being used as a means 
toward federal ends.32 He draws this conception from New York v. United 
States, in which the Court held that “even where Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it 
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those 
acts.”33 Therefore, the Court held in Printz, the federal government may not 
“issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems” 
through their legislative or law enforcement authorities.34 The cost that 
such federal directives would impose on the states is more than just the 
economic cost of state policies foregone in the diversion of resources to the 
enforcement of federal policy. This kind of commandeering also would 
reduce state autonomy to pursue policies that are inconsistent with those 
imposed by the federal government. 
Consider the medical marijuana example. A state may choose to strike 
its own balance between the legitimate and illegitimate use of marijuana by 
regulating medical marijuana users through a registry, subject to the risk 
that federal agents will independently enforce the federal prohibition on 
marijuana use. But if federal agents commandeer the state registry for 
information on medical marijuana users, state policymakers who support 
medical marijuana and do not want to facilitate the federal prohibition of 
what they deem to be legitimate uses may be forced to discontinue the 
registry. Then the state must choose between strictly limiting access to 
marijuana through means other than a registry (for example, a general 
prohibition on payment for medical marijuana services and products35), 
which effectively would bar what the state deems to be legitimate uses (for 
example, medical use by patients unable to grow their own marijuana), or 
deregulating marijuana generally, which would allow what the state deems 
to be illegitimate uses (for example, recreational use). As Professor Mikos 
 
31 See id. at 133-34 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions that ”rebuff[ ] state autono-
my”); id. at 164-77 (outlining various ways the courts could restore state autonomy). 
32 See, e.g., id. at 162-63. 
33 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); cf. Mikos, supra note 14, at 163 (quot-
ing this passage of New York, 505 U.S. 144). 
34 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
35 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-308(6)(a) (2011) (“A provider or marijuana-infused 
products provider may not . . . accept anything of value, including monetary remuneration, for 
any services or products provided to a registered cardholder.”). 
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explains, federal policy displaces state policy here not because of the 
independent federal law, the limited federal enforcement of which the state 
must be willing to bear under the Supremacy Clause, but because of the 
federal government’s dependence on “commandeering” the state’s registry 
to its own law enforcement uses.36 
Such autonomy costs may be even greater than the arguably “minimal 
and only temporary burden upon state officers” at issue in Printz.37 In 
Printz, the Court noted (as an afterthought) that Montana law generally 
prohibited local law enforcement officers from regulating or delaying the 
transfer of any handgun,38 a confirmation that the state officials were indeed 
coerced and not acting voluntarily under the federal law. The point goes 
beyond whether or not state actors felt federal coercion, however, and to the 
deeper violation of autonomy that occurs when federal officers turn a state’s 
regulatory apparatus against itself. Whereas the primary cost to states of 
commandeering identified in Printz is the reprioritization of state economic 
resources away from state and toward federal policy,39 regardless of whether 
the policies are consistent, the primary burden Professor Mikos identifies is 
the immediate frustration of state policy by opposing federal policy.40 To 
the extent we value federalism as a protection of state autonomy, it is bad to 
use states as a means to federal ends, but it is even worse to use states as a 
means to federal ends that defeat the states’ own ends. As Heather Gerken 
observes, “[F]reedom from interference does not amount to much unless 
there is something to do with that freedom.”41 
B. Accountability Costs 
The Court explained in New York that “Accountability is . . . diminished 
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in 
accordance with the views of the local electorate.”42 These accountability 
 
36 See Mikos, supra 14, at 113 (“[I]magine how the information contained in a state med-
ical marijuana registry could bolster ongoing efforts to enforce the federal ban against 
medical marijuana.”). 
37 Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (quoting one of the federal government’s rejected arguments). 
38 Id. at 934 n.18 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-351 (1) (1995)). 
39 See, e.g., id. at 930 (demonstrating that the “financial burden[s] of implementing a federal 
regulatory program” was a primary, anti-commandeering concern). 
40 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 132 (“[I]f state officials refuse to gather such information, they 
will undermine their own policy objectives.”). 
41 Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1553 n.8 (2012). 
42 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
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costs manifest in terms of both misplaced credit to federal officials and 
misplaced blame on state officials. First, “[b]y forcing state governments to 
absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, 
Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having 
to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.”43 
Second, as Professor Mikos explains, “[s]tate officials might be unfairly 
blamed for providing information to federal officials and advancing contro-
versial federal policies.”44 Commandeering information may aggravate these 
accountability problems in distinct ways not addressed by New York or Printz. 
Accountability costs to states include perceptions of commandeering 
that unfairly credit federal officials for state enforcement.45 In the medical 
marijuana example above, state officials might abandon information-
gathering efforts because they would rather sacrifice their preferred policy 
than be blamed for being “a snitch” in Professor Mikos’s terms.46 But at 
other times, federal law enforcement officials might seek credit for exposing 
abuses of state medical marijuana policy, for example, by bringing federal 
drug trafficking charges against production and distribution operations that 
exceed the legitimate scope under state law, where most of the detective 
work was a byproduct of preexisting state regulation and information 
gathering. Worse, such credit-shifting to federal enforcement (even if it 
occurs with state cooperation) might be viewed by the state’s citizens as 
 
43 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. The joint dissenters in Sebelius summarized the accountability 
principle and, more importantly, suggested the weight they accord it in commandeering analysis. 
When Congress compels the States to do its bidding, it blurs the lines of political 
accountability. . . . [W]hen the Federal Government compels the States to take un-
popular actions, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapprov-
al, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. . . . If a program is pop-
ular, state officials may claim credit; if it is unpopular, they may protest that they 
were merely responding to a federal directive. 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2660-61 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 
& Alito, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
44 Mikos, supra note 14, at 121. 
45 The risk of wrongly assigning blame or credit runs both ways. Sometimes state officials 
will be unfairly credited for simply acquiescing in federal commands. For instance, the state 
officials who accept the Medicaid expansion created through President Obama’s healthcare 
reforms may take more credit than they deserve for a program largely funded with federal money. 
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) (“Whatever the increase in state obligations after the [Affordable 
Care Act], it will pale in comparison to the increase in federal funding.”). 
46 Mikos, supra note 14, at 131. 
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outsiders reining in what appears to be an “out-of-control” state policy, thus 
undermining the state policy’s legitimacy. 
Another important distinction that makes commandeering information 
more costly than the commandeering at issue in Printz is that in Printz, the 
commandeering occurred in plain view. According to the Court, the 
publicity of the state official’s compelled information-collection made state 
citizens likely to blame the state official for the federal policy.47 But this 
may overstate the amount of blame directed at the state official and under-
state the amount of blame redirected at the federal policy. Sheriff Printz, 
after all, did not need the Supreme Court to tell the gun buyers of Ravalli 
County, Montana, who was behind the Brady Act’s background checks,48 
and it is easy to imagine how a fiercely independent local official might have 
disabused anyone of the notion that he was a federal “snitch.”  
Similarly, Professor Mikos explains how the Michigan Attorney Gen-
eral’s compliance with a federal subpoena for privileged medical marijuana 
registration information incited an “uproar.”49 But this may not be repre-
sentative of how the blame game works for information commandeering. 
Not every incident will elicit such a response. With the clandestine coop-
eration of certain state officials, federal officials might commandeer infor-
mation out of public view through bureaucratic processes or criminal 
procedures that may come to light only in later enforcement actions, if at 
all. When information commandeering is concealed, state officials might be 
more willing to compromise state policy in response to federal requests—at 
a hidden cost to state autonomy—precisely because there is a lack of 
accountability and certain state officials can promote their own collateral 
interests through such disclosures. This may be a particular danger in the 
case of popularly enacted laws like many state medical marijuana policies, 
where there may not be a strong constituency within the state government 
supportive of the policy. 
These dynamics of assigning credit and blame to state and federal offi-
cials complicates any assessment of proper political accountability in a 
federal system. As Roderick Hills explains, “one would have to bar the 
 
47 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (“Under the present law, for example, it will be the [local law 
enforcement officer] and not some federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and 
immediate possession of his gun.”). 
48 See id. at 958 n.18 (“Sheriffs Printz and Mack have made public statements . . . denouncing 
the Brady Act.”). 
49 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 130 n.121. 
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federal and state governments from ever assuming any overlapping duties 
in order to guarantee ‘accountability.’”50 Overlapping federal and state 
duties are pervasive across policy domains, however. So case-by-case 
constitutional adjudication may not be the most effective means of increas-
ing political accountability, particularly for something as subtle as the 
benefit- and cost-shifting involved in commandeering information. 
II. THE LIMITS OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING CONSTRAINT 
The policy autonomy and political accountability costs imposed by the cur-
rent intermingling of state and federal regimes means the anti-commandeering 
rule is an important constraint on federal policy. “The power of the Federal 
Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress 
into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 50 
States.”51 This constraint is particularly powerful when “the states’ ability to 
refuse to enforce federal law gives them de facto control over a number of 
important policy domains that are, formally speaking, subject to congres-
sional regulation.”52 Yet the anti-commandeering rule did not appear as a 
judicially enforceable constraint until two decades ago.53 For the prior 
twenty decades the federal government’s use of such a “highly attractive 
power,” was constrained only by nonjudicial (that is, political) forces.54 And 
in the hands of the federal judiciary over the last twenty years, it has 
remained an untested and narrow constraint for at least two reasons. 
First, the federal government’s commitment of its own enforcement 
resources is itself part of federal policy choice. Congress’s policy to prohibit 
marijuana use, for example, cannot be viewed in isolation from its policy to 
fund federal drug law enforcement at levels that in most cases decriminalize 
use by medical marijuana patients in the states. Planned under-enforcement 
may not be the most transparent or consistent means of executing federal 
policy, but if we credit state policymakers with rational expectations about 
 
50 Hills, supra note 13, at 828; see also id. (“The difficulty with such political accountability 
arguments is that they overlook the complexity inherent in any system of federalism that always 
has the potential to confuse voters and thereby undermine political accountability.”). 
51 Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
52 Mikos, supra note 14, at 163-64 (citing Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1463-
79 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, Limits]). 
53 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992). 
54 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905; see also id. at 953 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n entirely ap-
propriate concern for the prerogatives of state government readily explains Congress' sparing use 
of this otherwise ‘highly attractive’ power.” (citations omitted)). 
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the effects on state policy of federal underenforcement, as we should, we 
also should credit federal policymakers with the converse understanding. In 
other words, with minimal judicial engagement, the anti-commandeering 
constraint on federal policy enforcement has largely been self-imposed by 
the federal policymakers themselves. 
Second, when Congress does make a policy choice to recruit state assis-
tance in the enforcement of federal policy, it has several means of doing so 
outside of commandeering.55 Congress can avoid the anti-commandeering 
constraint through the spending power,56 conditional preemption,57 generally 
applicable laws,58 and the civil rights enforcement powers.59 While the 
Supreme Court has been careful to characterize the exercise of these powers 
as “voluntary state participation,”60 “incidental,”61 or (in the case of civil 
rights enforcement) “remedial, rather than substantive,”62 in effect they can 
be just as coercive as commandeering. For example, the federal government 
could recruit state assistance in enforcing a marijuana prohibition by 
denying new federal criminal justice funding to states and localities that 
legalize medical marijuana,63 or, more drastically, by imposing a generally 
applicable law requiring all persons to report knowledge of marijuana 
transactions.64 Such laws result in economic and political costs to state 
 
55 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 166-72. 
56 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
57 See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1982). 
58 See New York, 505 U.S. at 177. 
59 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966). 
60 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.12 (1997). 
61 Id. at 932. 
62 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
63 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J.) (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable 
Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds 
comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that 
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
64 See e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (explaining that a law requiring states 
and private database owners to obtain the consent of citizens before disclosing their information 
“does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,” but rather 
regulates the state activity in the same manner as private activity). Professor Mikos suggests the 
Supreme Court’s recent holding that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
compel activity may rule out a generally applicable crime-reporting requirement. See Mikos, supra 
note 14, at 170 n.324 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589). Even so, a hypothetical medical marijuana 
reporting requirement might be sufficiently tailored to a triggering use of the channels or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 
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autonomy, law enforcement benefits to federal policy, and confusion over 
political accountability that are similar to those of commandeering. 
Given the narrow constraint imposed by the anti-commandeering 
rule, is its extension by the courts to federal use of state information 
desirable or likely? For the reasons discussed above, I believe Professor 
Mikos has made a compelling case that the logic of the anti-
commandeering rule should be extended to commandeering infor-
mation.65 But it is unclear how effective such an extension would be in 
protecting state autonomy to pursue policies in conflict with federal 
policy. Many of the federal reporting requirements Professor Mikos 
discusses are minor and unlikely to pose sharp conflicts with state 
policy.66 These requirements therefore are likely to go unchallenged or 
be easily replaced by voluntary (or funding-conditional) reporting by 
states. Others, like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
administrative subpoena power in investigations of employment dis-
crimination claims against state agencies67 or grand jury subpoenas in 
criminal investigations68 are generally applicable requirements that often 
are exempt from the anti-commandeering principle.69 
That leaves mainly the case of Printz itself, and Professor Mikos’s ex-
ample of medical marijuana registries.70 The rarity of reported federal 
subpoenas of medical marijuana registries suggests that the federal threat of 
commandeering such information may not pose a widespread and uncon-
strained threat to state autonomy.71 Federal law enforcement agencies may 
not rely that heavily on state secrets concerning medical marijuana patients. 
For example, the subpoena of the Michigan Department of Community 
Health that Professor Mikos discusses72 sought registry information for just 
seven out of as many as 70,000 registered medical marijuana users in the 
state—that narrow request surely reflects some measure of federal deference 
 
65 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 161. 
66 See id. at 115-16 (discussing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, the Crime 
Control Act of 1990, the Highway Safety Act of 1991, the Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 
1990, and the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984); see also id. at 166 (discussing the 
funding-conditional reporting requirement of the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980). 
67 See id. at 117-18. 
68 See id. at 119-20. 
69 See id. at 168-70 (discussing exemptions from the anti-commandeering rule for generally 
applicable reporting requirements); id. at 172-73 (explaining why one might argue that “investiga-
tive commands issued by grand juries should not be subject to the anti-commandeering rule”). 
70 See id. at 170. 
71 However, such a threat to state autonomy would occur if the federal government were 
using confidential means to commandeer information and avoid accountability. See supra Section I.B. 
72 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 118. 
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toward the state’s medical marijuana regime.73 Even if negating state 
medical marijuana policies were a federal law enforcement goal, it would 
be easy enough to accomplish under current law without the benefit of 
the states’ secrets. The federal government could pursue producers, 
physicians, and distributors whose businesses give them public profiles 
and thus make them more susceptible to federal prosecution than 
registered medical marijuana users. 
Where federal law enforcement does intrude more significantly on state 
autonomy, federal judges who are unwilling to limit their own subpoena 
powers under a statutory standard of reasonableness74 are unlikely to limit 
federal information-commandeering powers under a categorical constitutional 
rule.75 Thus, the prospects of the Supreme Court extending Printz to 
Professor Mikos’s medical marijuana anti-commandeering case may be 
similar to those of the Court extending the federalism principles of another 
gun regulation case, United States v. Lopez,76 to another medical marijuana 
case, Gonzales v. Raich, in which the Court disappointed Lopez supporters by 
upholding Congress’s Controlled Substances Act.77 With the notable recent 
exception of Sebelius, judicial safeguards of federalism typically have more 
bite in narrow, symbolic cases (like gun possession in school zones and 
temporary background checks) than in larger cases that threaten to under-
mine long-settled national policies (like the Controlled Substances Act or 
administrative subpoena power).78 
 
73 See United States v. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 10-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *6 & 
n.5 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011). 
74 See Mikos, supra note 14, at 144-49. 
75 See id. at 154-55 (explaining that even though the Printz Court “never actually held that 
demands for information are constitutionally permissible,” most lower courts have “simply 
presumed that Printz conclusively decided the matter and have upheld federal demands for 
information on that basis alone”); id. at 164 (“[T]he lower courts have seriously undermined [the 
states’] ability to refuse assistance and passively resist federal authority by allowing federal 
agencies to conscript [the states’] information-gathering capacity”). 
76 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a federal 
law banning gun possession in school zones, which “is in no sense an economic activity that might, 
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce”). 
77 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (finding that a federal law banning 
marijuana possession is constitutional because “comprehensive regulatory statutes may be 
validly applied to local conduct that does not, when viewed in isolation, have a significant 
impact on interstate commerce”). 
78 Cf. Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering 
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1348 (2000) (arguing the anti-commandeering rule’s “expres-
sive character may do more than would some other rule to protect an important aspect of each 
state’s role in our federal structure”). 
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CONCLUSION 
My disagreement with Professor Mikos concerns the efficacy of his 
judicial means, rather than the importance of his federalism ends. Profes-
sor Mikos’s analysis of the potential costs, both economic and political, 
imposed by federal use of state information seems correct. I am less 
confident that his prescription of an extended anti-commandeering rule is 
an effective remedy. The anti-commandeering principle in practice is too 
limited to protect against the most common incursions against state 
policies, and its extension along the lines suggested by Professor Mikos 
may be judicially intractable. The abstract and malleable concept of 
autonomy makes a particularly weak foundation for judicial enforcement 
of an asserted categorical rule with no textual basis, and only a contested 
structural basis, in the Constitution. Yet if he is correct about what is at 
stake for state autonomy when the federal government commandeers 
states’ secrets, then the structural protections against federal use of state 
information should stop neither at the anti-commandeering principle nor 
at states’ secrets.79 The depth of Professor Mikos’s diagnosis of what ails 
state policy autonomy and political accountability may call for a more 
ambitious, though less justiciable, federalism cure. 
Today’s deep and increasingly sectional disagreements on guns, immi-
gration, marijuana, marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and other policies 
exerts a centrifugal force on national politics that often overwhelms the 
capacity of the federal government to resolve them. Where broad new policy 
settlements on these controversial issues are impossible now, narrower 
settlements may be reached in the states first. Professor Mikos urges the 
federal courts to use the anti-commandeering principle to clear a wider 
space for these settlements to occur.80 
 
79 For example, despite Professor Mikos’s agreement with Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 
129 (2003) as a policy matter, see Mikos, supra note 14, at 161-62, the state autonomy costs of the 
underlying policy are significant. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 145-46 (holding that a federal law barred 
a state court from using a county’s report submitted to the Federal Department of Transportation 
as a condition for state funding). A federal privilege against the use of state-generated information 
in state (not federal) court is roughly equivalent to commandeering (or otherwise coercing) the 
state legislature to enact the same privilege. Thus, “preempting information” may reduce state 
autonomy in certain policy domains as much as commandeering information. As another example, 
federal law preempts state campaign finance disclosure laws, depriving states of an option for 
more effective disclosure requirements in state campaigns of federal candidates. See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 453 (2006); see also William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 335, 376 (2000) (suggesting that “[t]he regulation of campaign finance of federal 
elections matters could be devolved to the states”). 
80 Mikos, supra note 14, at 178. 
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Although I do not agree with him—in fact, because I do not agree with 
him—that the federal courts in general, and the anti-commandeering rule in 
particular, are likely to be especially effective agents toward such a reorder-
ing of federal and state power,81 I think other public officials, particularly 
state officials, should take the problem he has identified all the more 
seriously. With his powerful analysis of the costs of commandeering 
information, Professor Mikos can better inform the commandeered. 
 
* * * 
 
Whether the judicial or political process is the primary safeguard of feder-
alism, more attention should be paid to how the states themselves participate 
in those processes. In the judicial process, after all, it was elected state 
attorneys general and sheriffs who saw the legal and political opportunity to 
stand for federalism in New York, Printz, and Florida v. Department of Health 
and Human Services.82 Even if federal courts do not adopt Professor Mikos’s 
proposed rule, his conception of commandeering can facilitate political 
discourse on federalism outside the courts by providing an expanded 
vocabulary of federal coercion for state officials and voters to use in defend-
ing and advancing state autonomy.83 Indeed, federalism is thriving at least 
as much outside the courts as in them: the decision in Raich has not slowed 
the adoption of medical marijuana laws in the states, nor even marijuana 
legalization in Colorado and Washington.84 In this and other emerging 
policy domains, states are betting that federal officials’ political will to 
invade their autonomy is as limited as the federal courts’ constitutional 
power to safeguard it. To the extent this opens the channels of state politics 
 
81 For a view less agnostic on the issue than my own, see Mark Tushnet, Judicial Enforcement 
of Federalist-Based Constitutional Limitations: Some Skeptical Comparative Observations, 57 EMORY L. 
J. 135, 143-44 (2007) (“[T]he courts will never conduct a ‘federalism revolution.’ Their interven-
tions will have no systematic effects on the operation of our federal system.”). 
82 Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services was consolidated with National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
83 State court judges could use this vocabulary too. Compare Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. 
Montana, 286 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (concluding that a state court 
“decree in favor of the medical marijuana grower, caregiver, provider, or user is consequently 
meaningless because their activities are illegal [under federal law] regardless”), with Mikos, Limits, 
supra note 52, at 1423-24 (arguing that despite Congress’s ban on marijuana, states may continue to 
legalize the drug because Congress cannot preempt state laws that merely permit—by inaction—
private conduct deemed objectionable by the federal government). 
84 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; Wash. Initiative Measure No. 502 (July 8, 2011), 
available at http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf. 
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to negotiate diverse compromises between federal and state policy free of 
the rigid dictates of federal doctrine, that can be a good thing for federalism. 
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